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As a rule, public companies in the Republic of Slovenia use a two-
tier system of corporate governance. The supervisory boards of
such companies should execute the supervisory function by in-
forming and disclosing to the shareholders the data regarding en-
visaged policies of corporate governance. The principle of dis-
closure and transparency in general, and in the ﬁeld of remu-
neration, is used in the Republic of Slovenia as a systemic legal
method and tool, which enables better decision making processes,
supervision and control of public companies in the country.
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Introduction
In the Republic of Slovenia (rs), companies may choose a two-tier
management system by appointing a management board and a su-
pervisory board or a one-tier management system by appointing a
board of directors (zgd-1 2006). As a rule, public companies (pc)u s e
a two-tier system of corporate governance. The rs has been putting
in order corporate governance of public companies by implement-
ing the Regulations and Directives of the European Union (eu),
as well as its Recommendations and other acts of soft law (Djoki´ c
2008). As regards the ﬁeld of disclosure and transparency, the rs
complied with all the amendments of eu regulations regarding com-
pany law, accountancy, ﬁnancial reporting and revision. Slovenia
thus amended its basic company law, namely the Companies Act
from the year 2006 (2006) by recently adopting two acts amending
zgd-1 (2006), with the novels zgd-1b (2008) and zgd-1c (2009) and
consolidated three novels in the text of Companies Act – zgd-1-upb3
(2009).
In addition to the eu regulations, the rs implemented the recom-
mendations of the eu. Among the recommendations that were taken
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into account in the ﬁeld of company law, was the ‘Recommendation
for the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed
Companies and for the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board of
2005’ (Commission of the European Communities 2005), especially
in the drawing-up of the 2007 Slovenian Management Code for Pub-
licly Traded Companies (‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih delniških družb’
2007). This paper particularly shows the following development in
the rs, in the ﬁeld of disclosure and transparency of pc.
The rs regularly implements the legal sources of the eu (Direc-
tives, Regulations, and Recommendations), which is valid also in
the ﬁeld of disclosure, transparency and remunerations of manage-
ment bodies. The rs uses different legal techniques to enforce the
principles of disclosure and transparency of the corporate informa-
tion of public companies (deviations from the code should legally
be explained). The use of the combined legal techniques showed
signiﬁcant progress in 2008. Annual reports of listed companies in
the rs illustrated substantial development of disclosure in the ﬁeld
of remunerations. Public companies have been revealing more and
more information in their annual reports, which increases the trans-
parency of their results and the activities of the business operations
of public companies.
This article shows how management of public corporations could
be further or better controlled via disclosure and transparency. This
fact could inﬂuence the content of the management reports to the
supervisors and shareholders, as it could become more precise and
substantial. Management remunerations could become more deter-
mined and it is anticipated that they will depend more on the results
of the operations of public companies, rather than on the managers
themselves, as has been the case so far. If the remunerations of man-
agers are structured in accordance with a remuneration policy which
was accepted by the general assemblies of public companies in ad-
vance, these could bring positive effects to the corporate governance
policy of a speciﬁc company.
Corporate governance in pc in rs is becoming more transparent
and recognized also by stakeholders (creditors, loan providers, sup-
pliers, employees) and the public. Such an example could also serve
other companies, namely closed joint stock companies in rs, which
prevail in the economy. High expectations are focused on the super-
visors who play a key role in the enforcement of effective governance
in practice. Better supervision of a public corporation could progres-
sively establish favourable conditions for the enforcement of a model
of socially responsible corporations.
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Development of the Principle of Disclosure and
Transparency as a Legal Method in the Period 2007–2010
in Regulation and Practice
The execution of the supervisory function within a corporation is of
key importance, particularly in those areas where there is a possi-
bility of a conﬂict of interest between different management bodies
or when shareholders do not have the opportunity to directly partic-
ipate in decision-making. Such circumstances particularly arise: (a)
upon the appointment of directors; (b) in the remuneration of direc-
tors; (c) in the auditing of corporations (Commission of the European
Communities 2005).
‘Comply or Explain’ Principle in the cg Code
and its Consequences
T h eS l o v e n i a nc o r p o r a t eg o v e r n a n c ec o d ef o rpc from the year 2007
(‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih delniških družb’ 2007) has been appli-
cable to the public joint stock companies (pc) who have their shares
listed on the regulated market in Slovenia. According to the pream-
ble to the cg Code, the purpose of this code has been to deﬁne in
more detail the governance and management principles of pc,w h o s e
shares are listed on the Slovene regulated market. However, the
practice recommended in the cg Code can also be applied by other
companies, so as to contribute to a transparent and intelligible gov-
ernance system in Slovenia.
The cg Code leans heavily on the principle ‘Comply or Explain’
in all the above areas of potential conﬂicts of interest. The key el-
ement of this principle is disclosure. According to the cg Code, the
purpose of publicly disclosing a company’s declaration of compliance
with the Code has been in informing its shareholders, potential in-
vestors and other interest groups of the company’s system of corpo-
rate governance and the related corporate governance risks. In light
of the above, the objective of the Code was to urge companies to pro-
vide sufﬁcient information on their corporate governance practices
(‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih delniških družb’ 2007)
The ‘Comply or Explain’ principle allows companies to deviate
from the Code’s recommendations (except for provisions referring to
temporary legislation). Therefore not all the cg Code recommenda-
tions are binding for companies. The preamble of the cg Code gives
a detailed outline of the Code’s chapters and provisions, pointing out
those that refer to the relevant legislation regulating corporate gov-
ernance of joint stock companies and contain the word ‘must.’ Com-
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panies are therefore required to observe the legislation and may not
deviate from it. The Code’s provisions containing the word ‘should’
are recommendations and are not legally binding. Companies must
disclose any deviations from such provisions once a year in their
declaration on compliance with the Code, inform investors of any
deviations from such provisions and give the appropriate reasons
for them. Provisions expressed with the words ‘it is recommended
that / it may be done thus’ outline future development of corporate
governance in the company and disclosure of non-compliance is not
required (‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih delniških družb’ 2007).
When trying to establish whether public companies in rs followed
the cg Code provisions, we compared individual Code provisions
with the results of the Research of the Association of Supervisory
Board Members of the rs (asbm)( Z d r u ž e n j eˇ clanov nadzornih sve-
tov 2007a) in the area of remunerations of the supervisory board, and
some results of this research were compared with the data on public
joint-stock companies from the ﬁrst stock-exchange listing for 2008,
as indicated in the annual reports for the year 2007, published on
the websites of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (http://seonet.ljse.si).
According to the data in the asbm research (Združenje ˇ clanov
nadzornih svetov 2007a), the remuneration structure of the manage-
ment bodies of public joint-stock companies is not being disclosed
to the shareholders and the situation is even worse in the area of
disclosure of data which would ensure the shareholders a constant
oversight of the severance grants paid out to management bodies
and their relationship to the actual remuneration policy of joint-
stock companies or the envisaged remuneration structure. As re-
gards the remuneration of management bodies, the asbm research
was neither able to identify the criteria that individual joint-stock
companies deem the most important, nor establish whether indi-
vidual companies formulate short-term and long-term emolument
policies at all, or in what manner (Združenje ˇ clanov nadzornih sve-
tov 2007a, 27). We therefore tried to deliver practical results of the
newly regulated disclosure principle in the area which is deemed
to be problematic owing to conﬂicts of interest, and where a share-
holder was unable to supervise.
The cg Code (‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih delniških družb’ 2007)
stipulated that the amount, and the method of determining the
amount, of individual payments, reimbursements and other ben-
eﬁts of supervisory board members be set by a resolution of the
general meeting or by the Articles of Association. The Code recom-
mends that the criteria for payments to supervisory board members,
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which are set out and adopted by a relevant professional organiza-
tion, should also be taken into account mutatis mutandis.
The asbm Recommendations for the Membership, Work and Re-
muneration of Members of Supervisory and Management Boards
2007 indicate more deﬁnite policies with regard to the structure of
the overall remuneration of members of supervisory boards and
their committees (Združenje ˇ clanov nadzornih svetov 2007b).
The asbm Recommendations on Remuneration (Združenje ˇ clanov
nadzornih svetov 2007b) encourage the general meetings of joint-
stock companies to adopt a resolution to determine the remunera-
tion, reimbursement of costs and beneﬁts of members of supervisory
or management boards. Under Point 5.11. thereof, the general meet-
ing of a joint-stock company may, by means of a resolution, authorize
the supervisory board to autonomously determine the remuneration
of individual members of committees, payable from the budget of the
supervisory board.
As for the structure of the overall remuneration, the recommen-
dations also extend to more detailed deﬁnitions of individual cate-
gories of the overall remuneration which consists, under point 5.14.
thereof, of: (a) remuneration for the performance of duties; (b) meet-
ing fees and (c) reimbursement of costs and beneﬁts for the per-
formance of duties. The asbm Recommendations on Remuneration
(Združenje ˇ clanov nadzornih svetov 2007b) also provide more de-
tailed explanations of the indicated remuneration categories.
When reviewing the annual reports of public joint-stock compa-
nies from the ﬁrst stock-exchange listing for 2008, one can estab-
lish that the structure of the remuneration of the supervisory board
is more transparent, considering that the annual reports for 2007
disclose the remuneration of supervisory board members by remu-
neration structure and break it down into the following categories:
monthly allowance for the performance of duties, meeting fees, ﬁxed
and variable components of remuneration, participation in proﬁt
sharing, and option emolument. The reports are deﬁcient in that
they disclose individual remuneration structures for the entire su-
pervisory board and not by individual members, or they disclose
the overall remuneration by individual supervisory board members
without breaking its structure down in greater detail, while the re-
ports of certain companies fail to identify more speciﬁcally the re-
muneration of the supervisory board, for example the companies
Gorenje (Gorenje 2008), Petrol (Petrol 2008), and the Luka Koper
(Luka Koper 2008).
These comparisons demonstrate that the application of the disclo-
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sure principle has gradually improved between 2005 and 2008, by
providing more precise data to the shareholders and/or investors in
the ﬁeld of remunerations. The cg Code (‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih
delniških družb’ 2007) spoke about the application and structure of
the remunerations, and public companies have become increasingly
aware of additional disclosure that should be applied, and they also
use it in the certain frame. If this situation is compared to the situa-
tion in 2005–2006, progress can be seen. However, in the year 2007,
no Slovenian law or code had yet spoken about the general corpo-
rate governance policy (cg policy), which normally includes the re-
muneration policy as a very important part of the cg policy.
As we see further, the principle of disclosure was even more
present in the Slovenian regulation and practice in the following
year.
Corporate Governance Statement by Law in 2008
and its Consequences
Following the regulations and good practice of the eu,t h ers intro-
duced the institute of corporate governance statement. A corporate
governance statement is an additional instrument of control in the
provision of information to shareholders, stakeholders and the pub-
lic, particularly in relation to issues posing risks from the point of
view of conﬂicts of interest between the management bodies of pub-
lic joint-stock companies (Djokic 2009).
Article 70 of zgd-1-upb3 (2009) states that the business report of a
company must set out a fair presentation of the development and re-
sults of the company’s operations and its ﬁnancial position, including
a description of the essential risks and uncertainties the company is
exposed to.
In accordance with Paragraph 5 of Article 70 zgd-1-upb3 (2009),
companies whose securities are traded on the regulated market in-
clude a corporate government statement as a special part of their
business reports. A company may issue its corporate governance
statement as a separate report, together with the annual report of the
company. As a minimum, this quotes sections of the corporate gover-
nance code and includes information on: (a) the use of the corporate
g o v e r n a n c ec o d e ;t h ew a yo fu s i n gt h er u l eo f‘ C o m p l yo rE x p l a i n ’
with regard to the particular code; and reasons for not applying the
exact parts of the code; and (b) the basic characteristics of the in-
ternal control and risk management systems in connection with ac-
counting report system procedures etc. It also includes information
on: (a) signiﬁcant direct and indirect ownership of the company’s se-
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curities, in the sense of achieving a qualiﬁed stake as stipulated by
the act regulating acquisitions; (b) each holder of securities carrying
special control rights; (c) all restrictions related to voting rights, in
particular: restrictions of voting rights to a certain stake or number
of votes, deadlines for exercising voting rights, agreements in which,
on the basis of the company’s co-operation, the ﬁnancial rights aris-
ing from securities are separated from the rights arising from the
ownership of such securities; (d) the company’s rules on the ap-
pointment or replacement of members of management or supervi-
sory bodies, and changes to the articles of association; (e) authorisa-
tions of members of the management, especially authorisations for
issuing or purchasing their own shares; (f) the operation of the com-
pany general assembly and its major competences; (g) the structure
and operation of the management and supervisory bodies and their
committees (zgd-1-upb3 2009, Par. 5 of Article 70).
I understand the corporate governance statement as an obligatory
instrument of disclosure about the attitude of the public stock com-
pany towards the corporate governance system in the company. The
material information should be revealed to the shareholders. The
decision to ‘disclose or not to disclose’ is no longer questionable. In
the framework of Article 70 of zgd-1-upb3 it is mandatory for public
joint stock companies to report on the content of corporate gover-
nance issues included in the corporate governance statement.
The corporate governance statement is therefore also an instru-
ment for the control of shareholders, stakeholders and the public,
particularly relating to issues posing risks from the point of view of
conﬂicts of interest between the management bodies of public joint-
stock companies. Pursuant to Article 60a zgd-1b (2008), members of
the supervisory board of a joint-stock company are obliged to ensure
the drawing-up and publication of the corporate governance state-
ment in compliance with the law. Members of the management and
supervisory bodies of the company are obliged to jointly assure that
the annual report with all its parts, together with the corporate gov-
ernance statement, is drawn up and issued in accordance with zgd-
1-upb3 2009 and Slovenian Accounting Standards or International
Financial Reporting Standards.
It will take additional years to be able to check whether companies
have improved their corporate governance practices and not merely
published some data in their statements on corporate governance
and annual reports. The answer to such a question will indeed de-
pend on the ability of companies to precisely measure and antici-
pate their risk areas and the level of risk they can manage, which is
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the objective of corporate governance rules. However, examination
of the annual reports of joint-stock companies that entered the ﬁrst
stock exchange listing for 2009 showed additional improvement in
disclosing data on the remuneration of supervisory board members,
considering that the reports, as a rule, disclose them by structure and
by individual members (Intereuropa 2009). The ‘Comply or Explain’
principle, according to the code, was also used in 2008 by public com-
panies that were entered on the standard Stock Exchange listing.
For additional information, consult annual reports of the companies
Aerodrom, Terme ˇ Catež, and Etol (see http://seonet.ljse.si).
Another proof that public companies disclosed the basic gover-
nance information to the public is the accession to the preparation
of the new corporate governance code signed in 2009.
cg Code 2009 Relies on the Corporate Governance
Statement and Recommends the Disclosure
of the Corporate Governance Policy
On 8 December 2009, a new cg code was enforced (‘Kodeks upravl-
janja javnih delniških družb’ 2009) using a different approach to the
cg issues of the 2007 cg Code. The same signatories of the Code,
namely the Ljubljana Stock Exchange Inc., the Association of Super-
visory Board Members, and the Managers’ Association of Slovenia,
stress that there is no need for the new code to still contain bind-
ing statutory provisions regulating the governance of listed compa-
nies. Since the Code initially took effect in the year 2004, the com-
panies as well as the public have become increasingly familiar with
the provisions of the previous Code which were phrased with the
modal ‘must’ (shall, is obliged to, shall not, etc), and that listed com-
panies are obliged to abide by, under the law. The signatories also
agree that provisions representing the statutory minimum of corpo-
rate governance are summarised on the basis of Article 70 (5) of zgd-
1 (2006) in the description of the governance system they use. This
is why all provisions of the amended Code are in the nature of rec-
ommendations which are not legally binding. Since they represent
the basis of a sound corporate governance system however, compa-
nies must disclose any deviations from these provisions in their cg
Statement on an annual basis so as to inform investors of any devia-
tions from the Code and reasons for them. All such deviations must
also be disclosed by non-public joint stock companies which base
their cg Statement on this Code. The purpose of the new cg Code is
to deﬁne the governance and management principles of companies
listed on the Slovenian regulated market. The recommended prac-
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tices can also be applied by other companies in order to contribute
to a transparent and understandable governance system in Slovenia,
which promotes both domestic and foreign investor conﬁdence into
the Slovene corporate governance system, as well as the conﬁdence
of employees and the general public (‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih del-
niških družb’ 2009, 2).
According to the Point 8 (1) of the cg Code (‘Kodeks upravljanja
javnih delniških družb’ 2009), the supervisory board monitors the
company throughout the ﬁnancial year, takes an active part in draw-
ing up corporate governance policy and in establishing the corporate
governance system, carefully evaluates the work of the management
board, and performs other tasks pursuant to the law, company regu-
lations and the Code.
Corporate Governance Policy (cg Policy) is, according to the cg
Code (‘Kodeks upravljanja javnih delniških družb’ 2009), the frame-
work of corporate governance as drawn up by the supervisory board
and the management board, wherein they commit to and publicly
disclose how they will supervise and run the company. The cg Pol-
icy consists of:
• a description of all the prime governance guidelines, taking into
account the company’s set objectives, values and social respon-
sibility;
• an indication as to which cg code the company abides by;
• an outline of the company’s groups of stakeholders, its com-
munication strategy and cooperation with individual groups of
stakeholders (creditors, controlled undertakings, suppliers, cus-
tomers, employees, the media, analysts, state bodies, the local
and wider community);
• the procedure of informing controlled undertakings and share-
holders of the group’s strategy and corporate governance stan-
dards;
• the policy of transactions between the company and related
companies, including their members of the management and
supervisory boards;
• the commitment that the supervisory board will set up a system
of detecting conﬂicts of interest and independence in members
of the supervisory/management board, and measures to be ap-
plied in case of circumstances that have a material effect on their
status in relation to the company;
• the supervisory board’s commitment to assess its efﬁciency;
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• an intent to set up supervisory board committees, if needed, and
an outline of their tasks;
• a clear system of division of responsibilities and powers among
members of managerial and supervisory bodies;
• rules governing the relationship between the company (includ-
ing related companies) and members of its management/super-
visory board, who are not subject to statutory provisions on con-
ﬂicts of interests;
• a deﬁnition of the company’s communication strategy, including
high quality standards for drawing up, and the disclosure of, ac-
counting, and ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information;
• the protection of the interests of the company’s employees,
which are achieved by deﬁning the manner, content and stan-
dards of their work as well as by ensuring an adequate level
of ethical conduct in the company, including the prevention of
discrimination.
The cg Policy in Chapter 20 of the cg Code (‘Kodeks upravljanja
javnih delniških družb’ 2009) also deﬁnes the company’s corporate
communication strategy which dictates high quality standards with
respect to the drawing up and preparation of accounting, and ﬁnan-
cial and non-ﬁnancial information. In the framework of this trans-
parency principle, there are several recommended disclosures. For
example, Point 22.7 of the Code (2009) on remunerations stipulates:
the company discloses the gross and net remuneration of each mem-
ber of the management board and of the supervisory board. Such a
disclosure is clear and comprehensible to an average investor, and
includes, aside from statutorily-imposed content:
• an explanation of how the choice of performance criteria con-
tributes to the company’s long-term interests;
• an explanation of the methods applied to determine whether the
performance criteria have been met;
• precise information on the deferment periods with regard to
variable components of remuneration;
• information about the policy regarding termination payments,
including the criteria conditioning termination payments and
the amounts of termination payments;
• information with regard to vesting periods for share-based re-
muneration;
• information about the policy regarding the retention of shares
after vesting;
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• information on the composition of peer groups in companies
that have been studied with respect to their remuneration poli-
cies in the course of setting up a remuneration;
• policy in the company concerned.
On the above basis it could be expected that corporate information
contained in annual reports and web pages of public companies for
2010 will be more thorough, exact and substantial than it was before.
As an example, you may consult the annual reports of the company
Sava (2011). This leads us to the next ﬁnding: adherence by Slove-
nian companies to corporate governance principles is increasing. In
my view, this is the result of the determination of the legislator to
regulate the statements of corporate governance, as explained above.
This institute forced public companies to reveal their attitude to cor-
porate governance conﬂicts of interest issues and other corporate
information more precisely. Subsequently, they study the provisions
of the cg Codes and explain why they do not comply with a particu-
lar recommendation.
Conclusions about the Supervision Power
The article shows that the rs recently combined two legal tech-
niques for creating and developing good corporate governance prac-
tices. Both use the principle of disclosure and transparency as a
method of regulation. Such use of the principle of disclosure reveals
to the shareholders and public much more information about the
speciﬁc public company governance policy than before. It could be
seen and judged also as a tool of the supervisory boards for their
execution of power, which could ensure better supervision of pc.
The frequency of disclosure, and the transparency of the data on
corporate governance and potential conﬂicts of interest in this ﬁeld
from 2005 to 2010, are increasing in the annual reports of Slove-
nian public joint-stock companies. This indicates that the practice in
the rs follows the legislation’s demands and has been developing in
harmony with the regulations of the zgd-1-upb3 2009 and the provi-
sions of the cg Codes. The use of techniques of obligatory disclosure
of non-compliance with the Code provisions seems to be more efﬁ-
cient than previous regulation techniques without such obligation.
Regardless of the fact that no sanctions have been imposed by the
Slovenian authorities and that the effectiveness of the cg Code is not
being measured systematically in Slovenia, progress can be seen by
following the corporate information offered to the public and share-
holders.
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The Major Question Is: Could We Be Satisﬁed?
Analysis of the content of corporate governance information indi-
cates that information included in the cg Policy annual reports in-
sufﬁciently serves the purposes and goals which can be ensured and
provided by the principles of disclosure and transparency of corpo-
rate information and seen, in particular, in the: reduction or elim-
ination of conﬂicts of interest between the management bodies of
a corporation; concretization of the elements of remuneration and
stimulations to the management with a view to improving the op-
eration of an individual corporation, its ﬁnancial performance and
business excellence; the establishment of appropriate supervision
mechanisms for a concrete corporation and competent execution of
the supervisory function and best balance of supervision costs.
A corporate governance statement is understood to be an addi-
tional instrument of control in the provision of information to share-
holders, stakeholders and the public, particularly relating to issues
posing risks from the viewpoint of conﬂicts of interest between the
management bodies of public joint-stock companies.
It is therefore important that, the corporate government statement
is also recognised in practice as an important instrument of cor-
porate governance. The declaration of corporate governance under
Article 70 of the zgd-1-upb3 2009 is not merely an administrative
document which must accompany an annual report of a public joint
stock company. Its content and the accurate disclosure of the data
contained therein can constitute the basis for decision-making at the
general meetings of joint-stock companies and for the supervision
and control of the corporation. The cg Code (‘Kodeks upravljanja
javnih delniških družb’ 2009) outlines the content of the information
to be disclosed and the way it should be provided.
Disclosed and transparent policies of public (and other) compa-
nies in the rs are particularly important and relevant because of the
corporate governance system transformation and the lack of tradi-
tion in this ﬁeld. In a country where close personal and business
connections are obvious to everybody, the use of the disclosure and
transparency principle could encourage corporate governance to be
more professional and effective.
In this aspect I ﬁnd the role of the supervision board even more
important in the future development of corporate governance in the
rs. The execution of the supervisory function within a corporation
is of key importance, particularly in those areas where it is believed
that there exists the possibility of a conﬂict of interest between dif-
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ferent management bodies or when shareholders do not have the
possibility of direct decision-making.
The supervisory board can direct and dictate the disclosure of
data and inﬂuence the transparency of corporate operations and
decision-making by shareholders. The supervisory board plays a
key role in supervising the drawing-up and publication of corpo-
rate strategic documents and annual reports on corporate operations
and in the drawing-up of proposals for decision-making by the gen-
eral meetings of joint-stock companies. By virtue of such a role and
powers, the supervisory board also participates in preparation of the
statement of corporate governance, the cg Policy, and the remuner-
ation policy as a part of it. The supervisory board is a body whose
actions can introduce and enforce a balance between the interests
of managers and those of corporation owners, subject to the efﬁcient
existence and functioning of a corporation.
I understand, and consider the balancing of the interests of a joint-
stock company as a corporation, as the central issue of contemporary
economy and society in general. Although the means of balancing
can be different, they all require a responsible engagement by indi-
viduals, and the credibility of their conduct and work in the perform-
ance of their functions.
The supervisory board is a body which can fulﬁl the social respon-
sibility of a corporation or possibly serve the shareholders or the
management. We will be able to monitor, analyse and evaluate future
development if the companies use the disclosure and transparency
principle.
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